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Note
ECONOMIC CREDENTIALING:
YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE!
The economic overhaul of health care in America is restruc-
turing the business of medicine, and with it the relationship
between physician and patient. Previously accustomed to
thinking primarily about the best interests of each patient,
the physician now finds this traditional loyalty in conflict
with competing concerns, including those of government,
business, and insurers who watch with alarm the relentless
rise in their health care expenditures. And there are compet-
ing interests of hospitals, health maintenance organizations,
and other provider-institutions who find their survival
threatened by high-powered competition and increasingly
stringent resource limits, and interests of other physicians
and their patients whose health needs compete for limited
health care dollars.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A HEART SURGEON at County Memorial Hospital recentlyhad her hospital privileges2 revoked by the hospital board.
Revocation came after a routine peer review' by the hospital's
medical staff. As a practicing physician at County Memorial,
this surgeon maintained a stellar success rate, her quality of
care was impeccable, her competence was unquestioned, and
1. E. Haavi Morreim, Economic Disclosure And Economic Advocacy: New Duties in
The Medical Standard of Care, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 275, 275 (1991).
2. Hospital privileges (also known as clinical privileges) are defined as "[p]ermission
to provide medical or other patient care services in the granting institution, within well-
defined limits, based on the individual's professional license and his/her experience, compe-
tence, ability, and judgment." Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs., THE
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 53 (1993) [hereinafter JCAHO MANUAL]. Phy-
sicians must have such privileges in order to use the beds, equipment and support staff
within the facility. Id.
3. Peer review (also known as credentialing) is where "[t]he organization establishes
hospital-specific mechanisms for the appointment and reappointment of medical staff mem-
bers and the granting and renewal/revision of clinical privileges." Id.
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her patients liked her. However, she had one problem: she did
not sufficiently contribute to the bottom line of the hospital.4 In
other words, the hospital decided that she was not making
enough money for the hospital, and for that reason alone, she is
no longer permitted to admit patients there.'
Due to the current rising costs of health care, the practice
of medicine is undergoing an economic overhaul.6 The eco-
nomic difficulties which hospitals are experiencing are evi-
denced by the fact that between 1980 and 1989, low profits and
high competition led to the closure of nearly 700 hospitals in
this country.7 These economic troubles have forced hospitals to
behave more like businesses" and less like the charitable insti-
tutions they once were.9
Furthermore, hospitals are being held liable for the wrong-
doings that occur within their facilities.10 This liability has led
to the creation of the medical staff peer review process to en-
sure the quality and competence of the physicians practicing in
a hospital. Through peer reviews, physicians are reviewed based
on various criteria to determine whether or not they will be
allowed privileges to admit and treat their patients in the hospi-
tal. In order for a hospital to relieve itself of malpractice liabil-
ity, it enforces these peer review decisions to prevent incompe-
tent physicians from obtaining privileges.
4. There are a number of ways a physician negatively may affect the bottom line.
Her procedures may cost more than the Diagnostic Related Group ("DRG") payment will
reimburse, she may have many Medicaid patients who typically are not as profitable as
other patients, or she may be competing with the particular hospital by also treating pa-
tients at another hospital. See infra notes 85-106 and accompanying text.
5. This scenario could have been painted differently. Rather than having her cur-
rent privileges reviewed for renewal, the surgeon could have been attempting to obtain
privileges from the hospital for the first time. The same medical staff could have reviewed
her and decided that, although there is no question as to the quality of care this physician
would provide, she might not be the most profitable physician for the hospital.
6. See Morreim, supra note 1, at 275.
7. John D. Blum, Hospital-Medical Staff Relations in The Face of Shifting Insti-
tutional Business Strategies: A Legal Analysis, 14 PUGET SOUND L REV. 561, 561
(1991).
8. Morreim, supra note I, at 275.
9. See ROSEMARY STEVENS. IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH: AMERICAN HOSPITALS
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 17 (1989) (noting that the hospitals of today grew out of
public and private welfare institutions for the poor of the nineteenth century).
10. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 258 (IIl.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966) (holding that a hospital may be held indepen-
dently liable for negligently failing to monitor the quality and competence of the physicians
on its staff).
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Since the primary focus of the peer review process always
has been on the quality of care, recent attempts to define a
physician's qualifications for hospital privileges based on eco-
nomic factors unrelated to quality of care or competency con-
siderations, known as "economic credentialing," have been met
with substantial controversy. 1 While economic credentialing
considers the financial impact a physician has on the hospital,
it completely disregards the competence, skill and quality of
the physician's work. Under a policy of economic credentialing,
a physician could be excluded for treating too many poor pa-
tients, for having privileges in a competing hospital, or for sim-
ply providing complete and effective care. Although the hospi-
tal may have a financial rationale for such a policy, economic
credentialing ignores and interferes with the public's interest.
Although courts generally have upheld adverse peer review
decisions based on quality or competence concerns, whether a
court would uphold a peer review decision based solely on eco-
nomic considerations is uncertain.' As economic credentialing
has posed the latest threat to physicians receiving and renewing
their hospital privileges, it is sure to receive its share of litiga-
tion in the future. These economic factors will add fuel to the
fire in the already volatile arena of physicians suing hospitals
for the denial or revocation of hospital privileges.
11. See, e.g., Jay Greene, Hospitals Eyeing Physicians' Practice Patterns: Economic
Credentialing Is Being Tested To Reduce Expenses And Improve Quality, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Apr. 29, 1991, at 30, 30 ("[Slome physicians and experts contend economic
credentialing can lead to poor patient care by limiting services, reducing access to care and
interfering with the physician-patient relationship."); Mary T. Koska, Hospital CEOs Di-
vided on Use of Economic Credentialing of Physicians, HOSPITALS, Mar. 20, 1991, at 42,
42 (describing the policy at Haverford Memorial Hospital in which the hospital has "no
qualms about completely terminating [the physician's] hospital privileges if his financial
performance failed to improve."); Howard L. Lang, M.D., Curb Economic Credentialing,
MODERN HEALTHCARE, Apr. 29, 1991, at 28, 28 ("To enable physicians to continue to
advocate in the patient's interest, subversion of quality patient care to economic motiva-
tions must be stopped."); Commentary, Credentialing is a Fact of Life, MODERN HEALTH-
CARE, June 17, 1991, at 36, 36 ("Economic credentialing is a fact of life, and it will serve
in the future to bond more closely the physician and the hospital.").
12. As of the date of this writing, only one court in the country has ruled explicitly
on economic credentialing. See Rosenblum v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Med. Ctr.,
No. 91-589 (Cir. Ct. Leon County, Fla. filed June 22, 1992) (holding the denial of privi-
leges to a physician based solely on economic considerations is valid based on an interpreta-
tion of a Florida statute). This case is of limited value, however, as the physician was
planning to appeal the decision but never did because the hospital eventually granted him
privileges.
1994]
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This note argues that hospitals should not be allowed to
use economic credentialing in evaluating physicians because, by
ignoring quality and competency concerns, it goes against the
grain of public policy and unreasonably interferes with legiti-
mate health care objectives. Furthermore, as disgruntled physi-
cians have challenged adverse peer review decisions with some
success, based on breach of hospital bylaws or antitrust viola-
tions, economic credentialing will give physicians a stronger ar-
gument when attacking adverse peer reviews on these grounds.
Part II of this note discusses the hospital/physician rela-
tionship, explains the peer review credentialing process, and
provides a definition of economic credentialing. Part III ana-
lyzes how hospital policies, such as economic credentialing,
have a significant impact on society and should be implemented
only in the public's interest. Finally, Part III analyzes how ad-
verse peer review decisions have been handled by the courts
when challenged by physicians and concludes that these chal-
lenges can be utilized to invalidate peer review decisions that
use economic credentialing.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Hospital Structure
A hospital is described as a "three-legged stool" consisting
of the administration, the governing board, and the medical
staff.13 The hospital administration consists of salaried employ-
ees who are responsible for the day-to-day operations of the
hospital. 4 The hospital administration provides "nonphysician
patient care," such as nursing and operating rooms, and other
"institutional support services," such as accounting and data
processing.' 5
13. STEVENS, supra note 9, at 241 (identifying the three primary power structures
within the hospital and noting the current difficulty in drawing lines between a hospital's
business and medical functions); Blum, supra note 7, at 563. However, in spite of the
recent economic changes that have forced hospitals to be more concerned with business
issues, the basic structure of the hospital remains unchanged. Id.
14. John J. Miles & Mary S. Philp, Hospitals Caught in the Antitrust Net: An
Overview, 24 DUQ. L. REv. 489, 501 (1985). For a more detailed list of the duties of the
hospital administrator, see JCAHO MANUAL, supra note 2, at 41-44.
15. Thaddeus J. Nodzenski, Where Is The Quality in The Health Care Quality Im-
provement Act of 1986?, 22 Loy. U. Cm. U. 361, 380 (1991). Hospital administrators are
barred from admitting patients or providing other patient services without prior physician
consent. Id. at 379. Furthermore, while the hospital bylaws delegate some authority to the
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The governing board, consisting of the board of trustees
and governors, has the ultimate decision making authority in
the hospital.16 It is important to realize, however, that although
the board has the ultimate authority it rarely exercises it.17 In
fact, the board typically acts as a "rubber stamp," usually de-
ferring to the medical staff and approving their decisions. 8
The medical staff consists of the physicians who have been
issued privileges to admit their patients to the hospital for
treatment.19 In return for these privileges, physicians have vari-
ous responsibilities to the hospital, such as following the hospi-
tal bylaws and serving on various committees.20 One of the
most important of these responsibilities is participating in the
peer review process. 21
B. The Peer Review Process
A physician may not simply take a patient, walk into a
hospital, arid begin operating. The right of a physician to admit
patients to a hospital for treatment is known as hospital privi-
leges.22 Privileges are crucial to most physicians because physi-
cians need the beds, equipment, staff, and supplies of a hospital
in order to effectively treat their patients .2  The process by
which the hospital determines which physicians will receive
these privileges is known as credentialing or peer review.24
During physician credentialing, the members of the com-
mittee must decide whether to issue or renew hospital privileges
hospital administration, it is not authorized to supervise the manner in which physicians
treat their patients. Id. at 380.
16. John D. Blum, Economic Credentialing A New Twist In Hospital Appraisal
Processes, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 427, 459 (1991).
17. STEVENS, supra note 9, at 244-45 (emphasizing that, although boards of trustees
have the legal right to dictate medical policy, they usually defer to others).
18. Id. (recognizing that decisions about new members of the medical staff are nor-
mally based upon the recommendations of medical staff committees).
19. Miles & Philp, supra note 14, at 501-02 (discussing hospital organization and
staff credentialing). See also JCAHO MANUAL, supra note 2, at 53 ("All [medical staff]
members have delineated clinical privileges that allow them to provide patient care services
independently within the scope of their clinical privileges.").
20. Miles & Philp, supra note 14, at 501. For a more detailed list of the duties and
responsibilities of the medical staff, see the JCAHO MANUAL, supra note 2, at 53-73.
21. Miles & Philp, supra note 14, at 501.
22. See JCAHO MANUAL, supra note 2.
23. Nodzenski, supra note 15, at 378 (discussing access to hospital resources as es-
sential to physician's ability to practice medicine).
24. See JCAHO MANUAL, supra note 2.
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to the physician under review. 5 This decision is based on a va-
riety of factors such as the physician's competence, ability, ex-
perience and judgment.26 Any physician who is applying for
privileges for the first time to a particular hospital will undergo
such a review."' Furthermore, hospitals will submit physicians
currently holding privileges to the same review in order to as-
sure that all their physicians are competent and are providing
high quality care.28 Although the board has the final word on
any credentialing decision, most often they defer to the medical
staff's decision.2 9 The board's responsibilities to the credential-
ing of physicians, as well as other responsibilities, are illus-
trated in statutes"0 and common law,31 as well as the accredita-
tion regulations of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations ("JCAHO").32
25. Id. at 53.
26. Id.
27. Miles & Philp, supra note 14, at 502.
28. Since the granting or renewal of privileges are made for no more than two years,
a physician must have his/her current privileges reviewed every two years to maintain
them. JCAHO MANUAL, supra note 2, at 56.
29. See STEVENS, supra note 9, at 244-45 (explaining that decisions about new mem-
bers of medical staff normally are based upon the recommendations of medical staff
committees).
30. For example, under California law the board is expressly given the final creden-
tialing authority. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 70701(a)(1)(A)-(F) (1991). Furthermore,
Illinois state law charges the board with the responsibility for the hospital organization,
management, control, operations, and appointment of the medical staff. ILL. ANN STAT
ch. 210, para. 85/10 (Smith-Hurd 1990).
31. Most courts have held the governing board responsible "to evaluate, counsel, and
if necessary take action to prevent unreasonable risk of harm by physicians to patients
treated in their facilities." James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Antitrust and Hospital
Peer Review, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1988, at 7, 17. The idea that hospitals
are responsible for the quality of care provided under their roof is known as hospital corpo-
rate liability. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (111.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). This liability imposes a legal duty upon the
hospital to engage in the effective credentialing of its physicians. Blum, supra note 16, at
461. The role of the governing board has also been characterized as that of a fiduciary of
the public. Id. See also Desai v. St. Barnabas Med. Ctr., 510 A.2d 662, 668 (N.J. 1986)
(stating that hospital powers that relate to the quality of care must be exercised reasonably
for the public good and must serve public health objectives).
32. Under the JCAHO standards, the authority to make the final credentialing deci-
sion rests with the board. JCAHO MANUAL, supra note 2, at 26. The board must act in a
timely manner to the recommendations of the medical staff. Id. If there is a dispute be-
tween the board and the medical staff, JCAHO standards require a joint conference to
resolve the issue in a timely manner. Id. The JCAHO standards are implemented in medi-
cal staff bylaws which are binding on the hospital. Id. at 58. For further explanation of the
functions of JCAHO, see infra notes 41-43, 71-78 and accompanying text.
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The result of the peer review may be a positive one; the
physician under review may obtain new privileges or have ex-
isting privileges renewed. On the other hand, the decision may
be an adverse one; the physician may be denied new privileges
or have existing privileges revoked. As would be expected, those
disgruntled physicians who receive adverse peer reviews turn to
the courts for redress. The following sections will discuss the
rationale for the peer review system and how peer reviews have
been implemented.
1. The Development of The Medical Staff Peer Review
Process
Today's system of medical staff peer review has evolved as
the relationships between physicians and hospitals have
changed.33 In the early twentieth century, hospitals were alms-
houses for the poor while wealthier patients were treated by
private physicians in the comfort of their homes.3 However,
with the growing concept of surgery in hospitals, physicians'
interest in gaining access to these hospitals also grew."
Momentum for hospital reform came about in the early
part of the 20th century with the development of state medical
boards of licensure and improved medical education.36 After a
survey from the American College of Surgeons ("ACS")3 7 re-
vealed substantial deficiencies in hospitals, the ACS established
a set of national standards for hospital accreditation. 8 The
ACS required that physicians affiliated with hospitals must or-
ganize into a medical staff 9 and that "medical staff member-
33. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 31, at 10.
34. See STEVENS, supra note 9, at 17-51 (discussing the public's initial resistance to
hospitalization and how wealthy patients were attracted by offering luxurious amenities in
the early twentieth century).
35. Id. at 34 (linking an increase in physicians interest in hospitals to the general
acceptance of the germ theory).
36. Blum, supra note 16, at 431.
37. By the 1920's, the ACS had emerged as a private organization which attempted
to establish voluntary ethics standards for hospitals. STEVENS, supra note 9, at 114. If a
hospital conformed to the ACS standards it was certified; this was similar to a "Good
Housekeeping Seal of Approval," in that it assured consumers that they could expect a
certain level of quality and standardization. Id.
38. Id. at 114-15 (after inspecting hospitals with over 100 beds, the ACS found that
less than one-seventh met its minimal standards).
39. Id. at 114 (organizing the doctors into a medical staff facilitated the implemen-
tation of the ACS standards).
19941
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ship must be restricted to doctors competent in their fields and
worthy in character."40
In 1952, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospi-
tals was created collectively by the ACS, the American Medi-
cal Association, and others. After initially adopting the stan-
dards created by the ACS,41 JCAHO eventually expanded the
requirements for medical staff peer review that were necessary
for hospital accreditation." As JCAHO has refined its stan-
dards over time, it has dominated the shaping of hospital medi-
cal staffs and the development of physician credentialing
requirements.43
2. The Implementation of The Peer Review Process
Several rationales have been proposed for the development
of the peer review process. Some take a paternalistic view, as-
serting that "[s]ince the medical field is so specialized, only
physicians can protect patients from poor-quality medical
care." 44 Others believe that the medical staff functions like
Consumer Reports, providing necessary consumer information
to the patients. 5 Medical staff reviews also are seen as a means
to control the utilization of medical services while internally
monitoring the quality of care. 6 Whatever the rationale, the
peer review process has been adopted as the process through
which accredited hospitals issue and renew privileges to physi-
cians. Indeed, common law, federal statutes, state statutes,
40. Blum, supra note 16, at 431-32.
41. STEVENS, supra note 9, at 247. JCAH (now JCAHO) was a private, not-for-
profit organization that became the only organization concerned with hospital standardiza-
tion. Id. There is no clear history of the establishment of JCAH. Id. at 247 n.49. Like the
ACS, compliance with JCAH's regulations was voluntary. Id. at 248. Although this ac-
creditation system was (and still is) voluntary, it was a stable system that became an ac-
cepted bureaucratic process. Id.
42. Id. (creating and then revising hospital bylaws, JCAH modified the peer review
process relating to the granting and withdrawing of privileges); Blumstein & Sloan, supra
note 31, at 10. JCAHO accreditation is important to hospitals because several states man-
date it, and under certain circumstances, accredited hospitals may be automatically eligible
for Medicare reimbursements. Id. at 11. Since accreditation is so important to hospitals,
the JCAHO standards for medical staff review are taken very seriously. Id.
43. Timothy S. Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals: Private
Regulation of Health Care And The Public Interest, 24 B.C. L. REV 835, 872-74 (1983).
44. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 31, at 12.
45. Id. at 13.
46. See id. at 12-13 (reviewing the battle between quality assurance of care versus
the conflict of interest with cost).
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JCAHO regulations, and medical staff bylaws all have a hand
in the implementation of the peer review process.
Common Law: At one time, the perception was that hospitals
did not act through their physicians, but rather that they pro-
cured physicians who were responsible for their own actions.47
Under this view, the hospitals were not legally responsible for
their physicians' torts. However, in the landmark ruling of Dar-
ling v. Charlestown Community Hospital,48 the Supreme
Court of Illinois established that a hospital may be held inde-
pendently liable for negligently failing to monitor the quality
and competence of the physicians on its staff.4 9 The Darling
court stated,
Certainly the person who avails himself of 'hospital facilities'
expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that
the nurses or other employees will act on their own responsi-
bility. The Standards for Hospital Accreditation, the state li-
censing regulations and the [hospital's] bylaws demonstrate
that the medical Profession and other responsible authorities
regard it as both desirable and feasible that a hospital as-
sume certain responsibilities for the care of the patients. 50
It was at this juncture that the common law first recognized
that hospitals could be held responsible for torts under a theory
of corporate liability.
Similarly, in Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospi-
tal51 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin further defined the hos-
pital's duty. In Johnson, the court held that "a hospital owes a
duty to its patients to exercise reasonable care in-the selection
of its medical staff and in granting specialized privileges."52
Here, the court specifically stated that this is to be accom-
plished via the peer review process by investigating the physi-
cian's competence, education, training, experience, adverse
malpractice actions, and by determining whether the physician
47. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (I11.
1965) cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966) (quoting Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y.
1957)).
48. 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
49. Id. at 258.
50. Id. at 257 (quoting Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 8).
51. 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981) (asserting duty of hospital to exercise reasonable
care in medical staff privileging and selection).
52. Id. at 174.
19941
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has lost privileges in any other hospital.53 Therefore, the John-
son court made it clear that the objective of the peer review is
to insure a high quality of care in the hospital and failure to
use the peer review process to insure such quality may result in
liability to the hospital. 5
Federal Statute: In attempting to deal with the medical mal-
practice crisis, Congress enacted the Health Care Quality Im-
provement Act of 1986 ("HCQIA").55 The Act establishes a
two part program by which the medical profession can rid itself
of unsatisfactory physicians by: (1) providing limited immunity
from legal liability for physicians who engage in good-faith
peer review activity56 and (2) establishing a national data bank
for reporting physicians' acts of incompetence and malprac-
tice.5 7
Although Congress stated that the peer review system is
critical in solving the medical malpractice crisis,58 it realized
that the peer review system could be used as a ploy to eliminate
the competition of perfectly good physicians. 59 Courts and com-
mentators have grappled with this dilemma in attempting to
distinguish good faith peer reviewers from those who are oper-
53. Id. (stressing that the credentialing committee does not relieve the hospital of its
duty to evaluate, monitor and admit only competent physicians).
54. Although not all state courts have held hospitals corporately liable for imple-
menting the peer review process, the trend is sufficiently strong and sufficient to lead one to
conclude that under common law such peer reviews are legally mandated. See, e.g., Bell v.
Sharp Cabrillo Hosp., 260 Cal. Rptr. 886, 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a hospi-
tal is negligent if it doesn't exercise reasonable care in selecting and reviewing the compe-
tency of its staff physicians); Elam v. College Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 165 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1982) (holding a hospital corporately liable for insuring the competency of its
medical staff); Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1989) (holding that the doc-
trine of corporate negligence imposes a duty upon a hospital to select and retain competent
physicians through the issuance of staff privileges); Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 170
(Wash. 1984) (holding the doctrine of corporate liability applicable to impose a duty on a
hospital to grant privileges only to competent physicians).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1988).
56. 42 U.S.C.§§ 11111-11115.
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-11137.
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 11101. ("The increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and
the need to improve the quality of medical care . . . can be remedied through effective
professional peer review."). See also Charity Scott, Medical Peer Review, Antitrust, and
the Effect of Statutory Reform, 50 MD. L Rv. 316, 323 n.24 (1991) ("limiting the poten-
tial legal liability of peer-review participants will result in more candid deliberation and
effective outcomes and improved quality of medical care").
59. Scott, supra note 58, at 329 n.54 ("[lit is likely that the [peer review] process
will be abused for anticompetitive or antisocial purposes .... ").
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ating in their own economic best interests.6 0 The HCQIA is
Congress' attempt to improve the quality of medical care by
encouraging and protecting the proper use of the peer review
system.61
The HCQIA grants antitrust immunity to physicians who
participate in good-faith peer review attempts to weed out in-
competent physicians.6 2 Congress specifically stated that immu-
nity will be provided to physicians who participate in peer re-
view activity based on "the competence or professional conduct
of an individual physician (which conduct affects or could af-
fect adversely the health or welfare of a patient or patients)."63
Congress specifically excluded immunity for "any other matter
that does not relate to the competence or professional conduct
of a physician." 64 Therefore, in enacting the HCQIA, Congress
was anticipating that the peer review process would be imple-
mented effectively for maintaining quality health care and
competent physicians.6 5
60. See, e.g., Miles & Philp, supra note 14, at 505 ("Ways must be sought to weed
out meritless cases early on, but without doing injustice to appropriate principles of anti-
trust jurisprudence.").
61. But see Scott, supra note 58, at 321-22 ("[Tihe statutory reform effected by the
Act falls short of that heralded by its supporters, and. . . because the Act does not change
the substantive rules governing antitrust liability in peer review cases, its much-touted 'im-
munity' is more imaginary than real.").
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a) (1988) (stating that anyone involved in the peer re-
view process "shall not be liable in damages under the law of the United States or of any
State . . . with respect to the action" so long as it meets the good faith standards of
§ 11112(a)). See also Decker v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 982 F.2d 433, 436 (10th Cir. 1992)
(concluding that the "HCQIA establishes immunity from liability" only, not immunity
from the suit); Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
HCQIA immunized the hospital and its physicians from antitrust liability for suspending a
neurosurgeon's privileges because the peer review was based on quality concerns); Smith v.
Ricks, 798 F. Supp. 605, 610 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ("In order to prove that the review actions
. . . were taken in the reasonable belief that they were in furtherance of quality health
care, Defendants must show that 'with the information available to them at the time of the
professional review action, [Defendants] would reasonably have concluded that their action
would restrict incompetent behavior or would protect patients.'" (quoting Austin v. McNa-
mara, 731 F. Supp. 934, 940 (C.D. Cal. 1990))); Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp.,
789 F. Supp. 1054, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 1992) ("The HCQIA provides immunity for discrete
professional review actions/decisions which meet particular standards, i.e., reasonable be-
lief that the action furthered quality health care .... "); Scott, supra note 58, at 331 &
n.62 (the immunity provisions of the Act were redrafted "to protect physicians who partici-
pate in a good-faith effort to weed out their incompetent colleagues.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (1988).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9)(E).
65. In order to be protected, the peer review must be:
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health
care,
1994]
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State Statutes: While most state statutes institute requirements
for the hospital peer review process,6" there is a split as to the
specificity of the requirements. Some statutes only serve as a
broad framework in which hospitals should implement the peer
review process.67 For example, Illinois law allows generally
flexible credentialing requirements that are consistent with the
institution's objectives.6 8 On the other hand, some states have
more detailed requirements.6 9 For example, Maryland law con-
siders that the credentialing process reviews the physician's ed-
ucation, clinical expertise, licensure history, medical history,
(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter,
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded ... , and
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known
A professional review action shall be presumed to have met the preceding stan-
dards necessary for the protection set out in Section 11111 (a) of this title unless
the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.
42 U.S.C § 11112(a) (1988).
66. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-17b (West Supp. 1993); FLA STAT
ANN. § 395.0193 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-15 (Michie 1992); HAW REV
STAT. § 624-25.5 (1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN, ch. I1 § 203 (West 1993); Mo ANN
STAT. § 537.035 (Vernon 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 441.055 (1991); Tx CIv STAT ANN
art. 4495b (West 1994).
67. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 11 § 203(a) (West 1993) ("The by-laws
of every licensed hospital and the by-laws of all medical staffs shall contain provisions for
reporting conduct by a health care provider that indicates incompetency in his specialty or
conduct that might be inconsistent with or harmful to good patient care or safety."); Mo
ANN. STAT. § 537.035(I)-(2) (Vernon 1988) (the responsibility of the peer review commit-
tee is responsible "to evaluate, maintain, or monitor the quality and utilization of health
care services or to exercise any combination of such responsibilities."); OR. REV STAT
§ 441.055 (3)(d) (1991) ("The governing body shall: [i]nsure that physicians admitted to
practice in the facility are organized into a medical staff in such a manner as to effectively
review the professional practices of the facility for the purposes of reducing morbidity and
mortality and for the improvement of patient care.").
68. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 210, para. 85/10.4 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (providing that, prior
to renewing a staff member's privileges, a hospital must request information from the state
concerning the staff member's licensure status and any disciplinary action taken against
the staff member).
69. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0193 (3)(a)-(g) (West 1993) (requiring that the peer
review committee find incompetence, habitual drug use, mental or physical impairment,
medical malpractice, large malpractice settlements, or failure to follow hospital procedures,
before altering a physician's privileges); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-15 (a)(l)-(3) (Michie
1992) (requiring peer reviews to include the "quality of the care provided," review of "di-
agnostic and surgical procedures," and the physician's "qualifications and professional
competence"); Tx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b § 103(9)(A)-(E) (West 1994) (re-
quiring the peer review committee to evaluate "the qualifications of professional health
care practitioners," specifically including evaluation of "accuracy of diagnosis," "quality of
the care rendered," "reports made to a medical peer review committee," and "reports made
by a medical peer review committee to others").
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claims history and professional experience.70 However, regard-
less of specificity, states tend to require that the peer review
process be based upon some notions of quality and competence.
JCAHO Regulations: The standards of the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations ("JCAHO") for
the peer review process are very specific.71 For example, they
state that although the governing board has the final authority
on credentialing decisions, the actual decisionmaking function
is conducted by the medical staff.7 Furthermore, JCAHO re-
quires that the medical staff maintain a set of bylaws that in-
cludes their rules for self governance." JCAHO also mandates
that each staff member is to have privileges appointed to him
or her 4 and that these privileges are to be awarded via a spe-
cific peer review process as included in the bylaws. 5 Finally,
JCAHO requires that physicians have their privileges reviewed
every two years by this peer review process.78 Although these
standards are of a voluntary organization, arguably they have
70. MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 19-319(e)(1) & (2)(i) (1990). Furthermore,
Maryland specifically requires that the reappointment process is to be done every two years
to review the physician's pattern of performance, utilization, quality and risk data. Id. at
§ 19-319(e)(2)(ii) & (iii).
71. See JCAHO MANUAL, supra note 2.
72. "The governing body is responsible for the final decision, based on medical staff
recommendations, regarding an individual's appointment or reappointment to the medical
staff and granting of initial or renewed/revised clinical privileges." Id. at 56. For the com-
plete list of regulations relating to the medical staff's responsibilities, see id. at 53-73.
73. "The medical staff develops and adopts bylaws and rules and regulations to es-
tablish a framework for self-governance of medical staff activities and accountability to the
governing body." Id. at 58.
74. "All its members have delineated clinical privileges that allow them to provide
patient care services independently within the scope of their clinical privileges." Id. at 53.
75. "Medical staff membership and delineated clinical privileges are granted by the
governing body, based on medical staff recommendations, in accordance with the bylaws,
rules and regulations, and policies of the medical staff and of the hospital." Id.
Although the guidelines allow factors such as geography of the applicant, malpractice
insurance coverage, and necessity of institutional resources to be considered, JCAHO re-
quires the medical staff to primarily focus on clinical qualification. "The criteria are
designed to assure the medical staff and governing body that patients will receive quality
care." Id. at 54. "The criteria pertain to, at the least, evidence of current licensure, rele-
vant training and/or experience, current competence, and health status." Id. "Board certi-
fication is an excellent benchmark and is considered when delineating clinical privileges."
Id. at 56.
76. "Appointment or reappointment to the medical staff and the granting or re-
newal/revision of clinical privileges are made for a period of not more than two years." Id.
at 56. These reviews require an evaluation of the physician's "professional performance
- . . judgment and ... clinical and/or technical skills ... ." Id. at 55.
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the force of law." Thus, JCAHO requirements have greatly
affected the way hospitals run their peer review systems.7 8
Medical Staff Bylaws: Like the JCAHO regulations, state law
also requires the bylaws to include the rules for the peer review
process.7 9 Since medical staff bylaws constitute a contract be-
tween the medical staff and the hospital, both parties must fol-
low the peer review rules and neither side unilaterally can
change them.80 Therefore, the bylaws will force the medical
staff to abide by the rules in carrying out physician peer re-
views.
In summary, the state and federal laws, in addition to the
JCAHO regulations, set the standards for which hospital peer
review will be implemented. These rules and regulations are
given life through the hospital and medical staff bylaws. As evi-
denced by these rules, the chief factor of evaluation under the
peer review system is quality of care. Since the bylaws are seen
as a contract that cannot be unilaterally altered, an attempt to
change the criteria of the peer review would prove difficult.
C. Economic Credentialing Defined
As noted above, the peer review credentialing process eval-
uates physicians based on quality and competence factors to
ensure that the highest level of care is being provided in the
77. For example, the federal government relies on JCAHO accreditation when certi-
fying hospitals to participate in the Medicare program. Jost, supra note 43, at 843. Fur-
thermore, many states have included JCAHO accreditation decisions into their programs
for licensing hospitals. Id. at 844. Finally, some private institutions, such as Blue Cross,
have required JCAHO accreditation to participate in their programs. Id. at 845.
78. See STEVENS, supra note 9, at 248-49 (describing how JCAHO has provided the
framework for establishing hospital peer review procedures).
79. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-17b (a)(iv) (West Supp. 1993) (declar-
ing "[m]edical review committee shall include ... a committee of any health care institu-
tion established pursuant to written bylaws . . . engaging in peer review, to gather and
review information relating to the care and treatment of patients. ... ); HAw REV
STAT. § 624-25.5(a)(2) (1993) (function of the peer review committee is "to maintain the
professional standards established by the bylaws of the society, hospital, or clinic of the
persons engaged in its . . . hospital or clinic"); OR. REv. STAT § 441.055(4)(e) (1991)
("The bylaws shall include . . . [p]rocedures for insuring that the facility's procedures for
granting, restricting and terminating privileges are followed. ... ).
80. "Each applicant for medical staff membership is oriented to these bylaws, rules
and regulations, and policies and agrees in writing that his/her activities as a member of
the medical staff will be bound by them." JCAHO MANUAL, supra note 2, at 53. "Neither
body [the medical staff nor the governing board] may unilaterally amend the medical staff
bylaws." Id. at 58.
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hospitals.81 However, when the hospital reviews a physician and
bases its privileging decision upon economic factors82 rather
than the preferred quality and competency criteria, the hospital
is using economic credentialing. The two key elements neces-
sary to identify economic credentialing are: (1) a physician
under review is only judged by economic criteria; and (2) this
economic criteria is the only factor directly tied to the decision
of whether or not to issue or renew the physician's privileges.8
Economic credentialing "has nothing to do with professional
quality and competence. "84
For a better understanding, the following are three illus-
trations of economic credentialing in action. Although these il-
lustrations may seem different, all three are examples of eco-
nomic credentialing being applied to prevent a physician from
obtaining privileges in a particular hospital.
81. See Lang, supra note 11, at 28 ("The credentialing process, as performed by the
medical staff, ensures the training and competence of the practitioners on the medical
staff.").
82. For example, issuing privileges to a physician who has a more profitable patient-
mix, or who does not have privileges in any competing hospital, or whose costs are lower so
as to make more money for the hospital - may occur regardless of how competent the
physician is. With economic credentialing, a top-quality, competent physician may be de-
nied privileges simply for not bringing in as much money for the hospital as other
physicians,
83. See Jay Greene, System Pioneers Credentialing, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Apr.
29, 1991, at 32, 32 (discussing. the policies of two hospitals that review physicians solely on
economic factors and tie that review to the credentialing decision).
84. Lang, supra note 11, at 28. A similar, but distinctly different practice is used by
some hospitals that monitor physicians' practice patterns to pinpoint inefficient uses of re-
sources. Greene, supra note 11, at 30. This practice, known as "Utilization Review (UR),
is a cost containment effort and quality assurance strategy implemented . . to ensure that
the services provided are both necessary and cost-efficient." Cheralyn E. Schessler, Liabil-
ity Implications of Utilization Review as a Cost Containment Mechanism, 8 J. CoNTEMP.
HEALTH L. & PoL'y 379, 380 (1992). See also Lang, supra note 11, at 28 ("Utilization
review seeks to avoid the provision of unnecessary services based on quality considerations,
including services provided without good cause when less expensive alternatives would suf-
fice as determined by professional judgment."). Such programs are used in hospitals to
reduce expenses while improving the quality of care. Greene, supra note 11, at 30.
The distinct difference between UR and economic credentialing is that UR is a quality
issue - not an economic issue. Id. "Overutilization, underutilization and inappropriate
utilization do not represent good-quality care ...." Id. Furthermore, UR is not attached
to the credentialing and decredentialing of physicians. Id. However, in one instance eco-
nomic credentialing is directly tied to the credentialing and decredentialing of physicians
and is not related to quality of care issues. Koska, supra note 11, at 42. Physicians are not
worried about the use of economic criteria that may flag quality problems; they are con-
cerned about economic criteria - unrelated to quality - being used in privileging deci-
sions. Id. at 46.
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1. Economic Credentialing to Maximize DRG Payments
With the current prospective payment system for reim-
bursement of hospital services (based on a system of Diagnosis
Related Groups, or "DRGs"), physicians and hospitals are
faced with competing incentives for providing health care.
Under the DRG system, the hospital is reimbursed a set fee for
each patient admitted - each patient being entitled to one di-
agnosis. 85 The diagnosis is determined after the patient is
treated and released from the hospital, thus with the benefit of
20/20 hindsight.86 Regardless of how expensive the patient was
to treat or how long the patient spent in the hospital, the hospi-
tal receives only the fixed DRG payment.87 Therefore, hospitals
have an incentive to keep costs down.
As hospitals are attempting to keep expenses down for
each diagnosed patient, physicians are operating under compet-
ing incentives. The physicians are responsible for diagnosing
patients, ordering tests, and performing the medical proce-
dures.88 Furthermore, physicians are reimbursed a set fee for
each procedure performed and are under a perpetual threat of
malpractice litigation should he/she negligently fail to perform
a procedure or test.8 9 Therefore, when in doubt, the physician
has an incentive to perform the extra test or procedure. This
incentive is clearly opposite the hospital's incentive to keep ex-
penses down. As hospitals want to treat the patient with mini-
mal resources and send him home, physicians want to treat the
patient as effectively and completely as possible. Hospitals
85. David M. Frankford, The Complexity of Medicare's Hospital Reimbursement
System: Paradoxes of Averaging, 78 IOWA L. REV. 517, 572 (1993).
86. Id.
87. Fred Bayles & Daniel Q. Haney, Doctors Feel Pressure to Keep Their Hospitals
Financially Healthy, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1990, at 26. For example: a patient is admitted
with chest pains which the physician thinks it is a heart condition. The physician runs a
series of tests and x-rays and concludes it was only indigestion. The tests and x-rays were
costly to the hospital. With the DRG system, the hospital will only receive one payment -
the payment for treating indigestion. Even though the hospital incurred more expenses in
the actual treatment, it still receives the one amount. Therefore, by minimizing expenses,
the hospital would be able to make a larger profit from each DRG payment.
88. See id. at 26 ("DRGs encourage the hospital to keep their costs down, and yet
the physician controls what the hospital bill will be.").
89. See Schessler, supra note 84, at 379 (stating part of the increase in health care
costs is due to the retrospective nature of physician reimbursement and the practice of
defensive medicine to avoid malpractice litigation).
90. See E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care,
75 CAL. L. REV. 1719, 1720 (1987) ("Thus insulated from the economic costs of their
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use economic credentialing to force physicians to concentrate
on lowering the expense of health care and improving profit
margins.91
2. Economic Credentialing to Avoid Competition
In Rosenblum v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical
Center,92 the only economic credentialing case tried to date,
Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center9"
("TMRMC") denied Dr. Rosenblum privileges to its cardiac
department solely because he had a contract with a competing
hospital, Tallahassee Community Hospital ("TCH").94 Because
of Dr. Rosenblum's contract with TCH to establish and run its
cardiac surgery unit, TMRMC concluded that he would re-
present a business liability to their hospital." Although
TMRMC admitted that Dr. Rosenblum is a "reputable sur-
geon with superior skills" and that his qualifications were never
967an issue, 96 they denied him privileges. 7 Rosenblum is a clear
decisions and inspired by the societal value that each patient should receive the best health
care available, physicians and other providers have had powerful incentives to deliver all
indicated care, and virtually no incentives to hold back.").
91. Green, supra note 83, at 32. Hospitals who have implemented such programs do
not hide the fact that this is strictly an economic plan for the hospital. They believe it is
within the "fiduciary responsibility of the board to make sure doctors don't bankrupt the
hospital." Id. In one situation, a physician was offered $1.2 million to practice at a hospital
based on his profitability to the hospital - not his quality of care or competence. See Steve
Sternberg, Doctor's Hospital Pact Sparks Federal Inquiry: Kennestone Deal Worth $1.2
Million, THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Nov. 19, 1992, at I.
92. No. 91-589 (Cir. Ct. Leon County, Fla. filed June 22, 1992).
93. TMRMC is a 771-bed private, not-for-profit hospital. Howard Larkin, Judge
Upholds Hospital's 'Economic Credentialing,' AM. MED. NEWS, June 29, 1992, at 5.
94. TCH is a 180-bed private, not-for-profit hospital. Id.
95. Id. (stating that running a unit at one hospital makes the doctor a business liabil-
ity at another hospital).
96. Id. (the administrator of TMRMC admitted that Dr. Rosenblum's qualifications
as a surgeon were not an issue in making credentialing decisions).
97. TMRMC said that it denied Dr. Rosenbaum cardiac privileges in order to pro-
tect their cardiac program, since Dr. Rosenblum appeared in advertisements for TCH,
might refer uninsured patients to TMRMC, and might recruit nurses from TMRMC's
cardiac program. Id. The court upheld the economic credentialing decision based on an
interpretation of the Florida statute which said "such other elements" may be use in the
credentialing process. Id. Rosenblum's attorney argued that "the hospital seized on ambig-
uous language in the law . . . and used it to write a blank check for economic credential-
ing." Id. Although Dr. Rosenblum planned to appeal the decision, the case will not be
appealed because he has since been granted cardiac privileges at TMRMC and maintains
privileges at both hospitals. No Appeal in Economic Credentialing Lawsuit, MANAGED
CARE LAW OUTLOOK, Nov. 24, 1992, at 11, 11.
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case of a hospital using economic credentialing to avoid
competition.
3. Economic Credentialing to Ensure More Profitable Patient
Mix
Under economic credentialing, physicians who do not have
what the hospital considers a "profitable patient mix" 98 may be
in danger of losing their privileges. 99 For example, since a hos-
pital is reimbursed for less than its actual expenses for treating
Medicaid patients,100 hospital's tend not to look favorably on
physicians with a large Medicaid practice. 101 The percentage of
Medicaid patients or charity care a physician provides are fac-
tors wholly unrelated to competence or quality of care. 02
Therefore, when a hospital decides against privileges to a phy-
sician based on patient mix, the hospital is using economic
credentialing. 03
From the above illustrations, it should be clear that eco-
nomic credentialing arises in different ways. However, in every
application, economic credentialing ties a physician's privileges
directly to his or her economic performance for the hospital,
while ignoring all other criteria. Economic credentialing is re-
ceiving increased attention in the 1990's.10 In some instances,
98. This refers to the proportions of a physician's patients who are private paying,
public paying (Medicare & Medicaid), and charity work. For example, a patient mix that
is mostly Medicaid patients would be less profitable because of its low reimbursement
rates. See Joan Beck, The Numbers Don't Add Up In Clinton's Health Care Package, CHI
TRIB, Sept. 16, 1993, at N25.
99. Greene, supra note 11, at 30.
100. See Lisa Colosi, Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association: Making the Medicaid
Reimbursement Rate Challenge a Federal Case, 12 PACE L REV 139, 146 (1992)
("Health care providers nationwide are experiencing financial troubles as a result of inade-
quate reimbursement rates by state Medicaid agencies.").
101. See e.g., Sternberg, supra note 91, at A17 (noting that a "hospital administra-
tor will not look kindly on an obstetrician who has a largely Medicaid practice .
102. Koska, supra note 11, at 46.
103. When a hospital decides which physician to court and which to abandon based
only on prospective revenue generations for the hospital, the hospital is using economic
credentialing. Since a physician's patient mix directly corresponds to the generation of hos-
pital revenue, a decision based on revenue generated is essentially a decision based on pa-
tient mix. See, generally, Sternberg, supra note 91.
104. A recent national survey, by professor John Blum of Loyola University, shows
"that most hospitals use economic criteria when reviewing physicians for medical privi-
leges." Jay Greene, Economics Widely Used in Reviewing Doctors, MODERN HEALTH-
CARE, Nov. 16, 1992, at 10, 10. This survey is part of an ongoing study that is attempting
to define the credentialing process and determine how hospitals use credentialing as a disci-
plinary tool. Id.
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hospitals are so divided on the issue that physicians are leaving
their hospitals.' 0 5 In other instances, state medical societies are
taking a stand against such policies.'06 However, the question
remains: will hospitals be permitted to exclude or expel physi-
cians based solely on economic considerations?
III. CHALLENGES TO ECONOMIC
CREDENTIALING
Society and individual physicians are both directly affected
by medical staff peer reviews. As people place themselves in a
physician's care with the hope of being cured, they rely on the
hospital to ensure a competent and skillful medical staff. Since
society has a vested interest in the competency and quality of
their treating physicians, hospitals should consider these inter-
ests when creating a policy that determines on what criteria a
physician will be reviewed for privileges. In addition, if the hos-
pital policy violates the medical staff bylaws (considered a con-
tract between the physician and the hospital) or the federal an-
titrust laws (prohibiting unfair competition), legal challenges
may be brought to invalidate such policies.
Since hospitals that use economic credentialing are not
concerned with quality or competence issues, such a policy
should be considered against public policy. Furthermore, unless
economic criteria is provided in the bylaws as a possible sole
criteria for evaluating physicians, economic credentialing would
constitute a breach of contract by the hospital. Finally, since
economic credentialing is not protected from antitrust scrutiny,
such a policy may violate the federal antitrust laws.
A. The Public Policy Challenge
Imagine this: You are sitting in a hospital waiting room,
before undergoing a major surgical operation, reading the lat-
est edition of Newsweek. While flipping through the magazine,
105. See, e.g., Proposed Changes in Bylaws Upset Hospital's Medical Staff, MOD-
ERN HEALTHCARE, Aug. 10, 1992 at 18, 18 ("Dennis Cavanaugh, M.D., a 43-year-old
surgeon, said he won't practice at Huron Regional because 'the hospital is going in a direc-
tion I cannot go.' ").
106. See, e.g., This Week in Healthcare: For The Record, MODERN HEALTHCARE,
October 19, 1992, at 14 (stating that the Medical Society of the State of New York and
the California Medical Association have both issued formal policies opposing economic
credentialing).
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you courageously scan an article regarding hospital care. In the
article, a physician is quoted as saying, "[y]ou learn the tricks,
learn the shortcuts, then hope you don't do anything wrong.' 0 7
Reading further, you learn that this physician has been told
that unless he becomes more profitable to the hospital, he will
lose his admitting privileges. 10 8
With the rising costs of health care, hospitals are in a situ-
ation where, in adopting policies, they must balance their pri-
vate management objectives with those of public interest. 09 In
order for a hospital to maintain a policy that furthers its man-
agement objectives, the policy also should further the public's
interests and certainly not interfere with that interest. 110 How-
ever, if a policy does not further any public health care objec-
tive, or unreasonably interferes with legitimate public health
care objectives, such a policy should be invalidated as against
the public good.
1. Hospital Policy For a Public Health Care Objective
Hospitals are responsible for operating for the good of the
public - not in their own private best interests."' In light of
this premise, the reasonableness of hospital policy should be
based on how the public health may be affected by the particu-
lar policy." 2 For example, in Redding v. St. Francis Medical
107. Larry Reibstein & Mary Hager, Physicians Cut Their Costs: Hospitals Get
Tough - But How Far Should They Go?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1991 at 41.
108. Id. (reviewing the battle between hospitals and doctors over economic creden-
tialing and its consequences).
109. See Berman v. Valley Hosp., 510 A.2d 673, 677 (N.J. 1986) ("Nevertheless,
because its exercise implicates the public welfare, as well as individual interests, this kind
of managerial discretion is not unbounded.").
110. See Desai v. St. Barnabas Med. Ctr., 510 A.2d 662, 671 (N.J. 1986) (stating
that a hospital decision "predicated upon exclusionary policies fostering only the well-being
of those staff members who are already admitted [to the hospital staff] ...must be
invalidated").
1l1. See, e.g., Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817, 825 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1963) ("Hospital officials . . . must never lose sight of the fact that the hospitals are oper-
ated not for private ends but for the benefit of the public ...."); Belmar v. Cipolla, 475
A.2d 533, 538 (N.J. 1984) ("No matter what arrangement a hospital may have with doc-
tors, its primary purpose remains to serve the public."); Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass'n, 366
A.2d 641, 646 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977) (stating that reasonable
hospital decisions should be respected as long as they are consistent with the public inter-
est); Berman, 510 A.2d at 676 ("[The hospital's] health care powers are deeply impressed
with a public interest." (quoting Desai, 510 A.2d at 668)).
112. See Desai, 510 A.2d at 665 (recognizing that the concern for the public interest
is significant in determining the reasonableness of hospital decisions).
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Center,' the California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's finding that the hospital's decision to maintain a closed-
staff policy was in the interest of "improving patient care, and.
* . reducing mortality rates."" 4 In that case, the court deter-
mined that the hospital policy decision was reasonable, even
though it prevented independent physicians from acquiring
privileges, because it furthered the public health care objectives
of improving patient care and reducing mortality rates.1 5
However, in Desai v. St. Barnabas Medical Center,"l6 the
New Jersey Supreme Court in determining the reasonableness
of hospital policy reached the opposite conclusion. In Desai, the
hospital adopted a closed-staff policy of issuing privileges to ap-
plying physicians." 7 The policy, however, had six exceptions
most importantly allowing privileges to an applying physician
who was "joining the medical practice of a current member of
the hospital medical staff.""" The court recognized that such a
discriminatory policy only could be upheld if it advanced a
public health objective. 1 9 The court concluded that since it
only benefitted those staff members who already were admitted
and was not in furtherance of the public interest, the exception
was unreasonable. 2 0
When making staffing decisions, the hospital must consider
not only public health objectives, but also the interests of the
hospital management. Hospitals are given great discretion in
their decisions, but only "to the extent that they exert their
efforts toward the elevation of hospital standards and higher
medical care."'' Therefore, in assessing hospital expenses and
quality-of-care concerns, hospitals always should remember
113. 255 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
114. Id. at 810-11 (agreeing with the trial court's attachment of "great importance
to the public policy considerations involved, the societal, public interest in the best possible
medical care").
115. Id. at 810.
116. 510 A.2d 662 (N.J. 1986).
117. Id. at 664.
118. Id. at 664 & n.1.
119. Id. at 668. Public health objectives include patient's needs, a reasonable oppor-
tunity to select physicians, and adequate access to hospital facilities. Id.
120. Id. at 671-72. The court stated that this exception not only discriminated
against physicians, it also limited access of health care to the patients. Id. at 670. See also
Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817, 820 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1963) (concluding that a
hospital's policy which restricted a patient's ability to select the desired physician-hospital
combination was not acting reasonably for the public good).
121. Id. at 825.
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that "their existence is for the purpose of faithfully furnishing.
facilities to the members of the medical profession in aid of
their service to the public."' 22
Hospitals have grappled with creating reasonable creden-
tialing policies that further both the interests of the public and
the interests of hospital management. 123  Since credentialing
policies have such a broad impact on the public welfare, hospi-
tals should be required to adequately support the reasonable-
ness of their policy.'24 Hospitals should support such policies
with information that "adequately demonstrates that a genuine
health care objective is reasonably and rationally served" by
the policy. 125 Without "persuasive information" proving that
the hospital needs such a policy to improve patient care, such a
policy should not be said to reasonably and rationally advance
a legitimate health care objective. 126
2. Economic Credentialing As Hospital Policy
Since economic credentialing is a form of hospital policy,
to be considered reasonable it also should further a legitimate
health care objective necessary to improve the quality of
care. 27 However, since economic credentialing "defin[es] an
individual's qualification . . . based on economic factors unre-
lated to quality-of-care or competency considerations,' 28 such
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Berman v. Valley Hosp., 510 A.2d 673, 676 (N.J. 1986) ("In deter-
mining the validity of a managerial decision made by a hospital, courts understand that the
major concern is whether the public interest in health care is reasonably and rationally
advanced by the hospital's decision.").
124. In Berman, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that the reasonableness of a
hospital's physician credentialing policy will be reviewed by "consider[ing] the nature and
adequacy of the information that has been advanced in its support" because such a policy
"implicates the public welfare." Id. at 677. The court further explained that "a hospital
decision of this character will be viewed favorably if it is reached in the normal and regular
course of conducting the affairs of the hospital, and is based on adequate information,
regardless of form, origin, or authorship, that is generally considered reasonable and relia-
ble by professional persons responsibly involved in the health care field." Id. (quoting Desai
v. St. Barnabas Med. Ctr., 510 A.2d 662, 669 (N.J. 1986)).
125. Id. at 677. In Berman, the health care objective was reducing and controlling
hospital overcrowding and excessive patient-bed occupancy. Id. The court stated that the
evidence did not demonstrate that the hospital's credentialing policy sufficiently related to
that health care objective. Id. at 680.
126. Id. at 680. The court went on to say that it expected the plaintiffs to be granted
full staff privileges, absent any valid grounds for denial. Id.
127. Id.
128. Lang, supra note I1, at 28.
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a policy should not be considered reasonably and rationally in
furtherance of a legitimate health care objective. With eco-
nomic credentialing, hospitals place the interests of managing
the hospital before the interests of the public - usually not
even considering the interests of the public.12 9 Such a policy not
only has no legitimate public health care objective, it also un-
reasonably interferes with several legitimate health care
objectives.
Access to Health Care: Most importantly, economic credential-
ing interferes with the public's access to health care. Since phy-
sicians only may treat patients in hospitals where they have
privileges, denying privileges effectively denies patients access
to health care. For example, a hospital may not look favorably
upon a physician who has a large Medicaid practice, since
Medicaid typically reimburses the hospital less than Medicare
or privately insured patients.130 If that hospital maintains a pol-
icy of economic credentialing, it would be able to revoke that
physician's privileges, forcing his/her patients to obtain health
care elsewhere. This may not be a problem if the physician has
privileges in another nearby hospital; however, if the physician
has privileges in a far away hospital or in no other hospital at
all, these patients will be denied the ability to select their de-
sired physician-hospital combination. 31 Denial of such access
129. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. For instance, an emergency
room surgeon on duty decided that his emergency room would be overwhelmed by attempt-
ing to care for all the victims of a car wreck. Bayles & Haney, supra note 87, at 26. He
ordered the ambulances to take the victims to three other hospitals, aside from his own, so
they would receive care more quickly; however, since less victims were treated at his hospi-
tal the result was less business for the hospital. Id. The hospital told him never to do that
again. Id. See also id. (keeping hospital costs down may require patients to be treated in a
non-individualized manner); Sternberg, supra note 91, at A17 (in which a hospital at-
tempted to jettison the chief of the pulmonary department - who netted the hospital less
revenue - in order to recruit a physician who later became one of the hospital's "Top Five
revenue generators").
130. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
131. See Greene, supra note 11, at 30 ("[E]conomic credentialing can lead to poor
patient care by limiting services, reducing access to care and interfering with the physician-
patient relationship.").
19941
HEALTH MATRIX
would not be considered acting for the public good.13
A policy restricting access might be considered reasonable
if it furthers quality or competency concerns;1 33 however, eco-
nomic credentialing removes these issues from consideration,
effectively eliminating any inference of reasonableness. Since
economic credentialing would allow a hospital to exclude a
physician without any legitimate health care reason while lim-
iting patients' access to health care, such a policy unreasonably
would interfere with the public health care objective of access
to health care.
Higher Quality Health Care: Economic credentialing also in-
terferes with the public health care objective of higher quality
health care. Indeed, one of the main goals of the HCQIA was
to increase the quality of health care by effectively removing
incompetent physicians who provided a low level of care.1 34
Congress was so concerned about removing incompetent physi-
cians that it legally protected good-faith peer reviews which
were based on competence or quality concerns .13  However,
under economic credentialing, the focus of credentialing turns
away from quality and competence, to concerns of economics
and profits. Congress specifically refrained from extending legal
protection to peer reviews that were not based on quality or
competence concerns because "such protection might be abused
and serve as a shield for anti-competitive economic actions
under the guise of quality controls."' 36 Thus, Congress deter-
mined that protecting such credentialing would interfere unrea-
sonably with the public objective of higher quality health care.
Since economic credentialing, by definition, is devoid of quality
132. See Desai v. St. Barnabus Med. Ctr., 510 A.2d 662, 666 (N.J. 1986) ("In de-
termining that the hospital's actions were not exercised reasonably for the public good, the
Court emphasized that the hospital's policy restricted the patient's ability to select the
desired doctor-hospital combination. (citing Geisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817
(N.J. 1963)).
133. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
136. Scott, supra note 58, at 331 n.62.
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or competence concerns, such a policy unreasonably interferes
with this public health care objective.
Reduce Malpractice and Health Care Costs: Finally, in adopt-
ing an economic credentialing policy, hospitals unreasonably
interfere with the public health care objective of reducing mal-
practice and health care costs. 13 7 As already discussed, hospi-
tals have an incentive to minimize resources and expenses for
each admitted patient.138 Physicians, on the other hand, have
an incentive to provide the best and most complete care possi-
ble to cure their patients and avoid malpractice. 3 9 Under a
policy of economic credentialing, physicians will be forced to
find shortcuts to keep their costs down in order to retain their
hospital privileges. 140 However, if physicians become more con-
cerned with the cost of an additional test rather than the poten-
tial good the test may do for the patient,14' clearly the quality
of care would decline, increasing the likelihood of malpractice
litigation and the overall cost of health care.' 42 As the public
has legitimate health care objectives to increase the quality of
care while reducing malpractice litigation and the overall cost
of health care, a policy of economic credentialing unreasonably
interferes with these objectives.
Although hospitals may have a rationale for implementing
economic credentialing policies, such policies simply do not fur-
ther any public health care objective. And while hospitals may
be given great deference in adopting their policies, such discre-
tion is not boundless. 143 Unless the hospital's policy is reasona-
bly and rationally in furtherance of a public health care objec-
tive, the policy should be held invalid as being against the
public good. 44 Since economic credentialing not only does not
137. This public health care objective arises from Congress' intent under HCQIA to
encourage good-faith peer review in order to rid hospitals of incompetent physicians. See
supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
140. See Reibstein & Hager, supra note 107, at 41 (noting that some doctors fear
that economic credentialing will lead to lack of health care for the elderly and indigent).
141. For example, the extra test may reveal an unforeseen problem. This test, there-
fore, enhances the quality of care provided while eliminating any malpractice suits.
142. See Schessler, supra note 84, at 381 (stating that the current rise in health care
costs is in part due to an increase in malpractice liability).
143. Berman v. Valley Hosp., 510 A.2d 673, 677 (N.J. 1986).
144. See supra notes 111-26 and accompanying text.
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further the public interest but also unreasonably interferes with
legitimate public health care objectives, such a policy should be
held invalid as being against the public good.
B. The Breach of Bylaws Challenge
As mandated by JCAHO and many state statutes, the
rules for the peer review process must be incorporated into the
medical staff bylaws.1 45 Therefore, when a physician receives
an adverse peer review decision, he or she may attempt to chal-
lenge the decision as not following the rules set up in the by-
laws. 146 The issues then become the extent of the legal signifi-
cance of the medical staff bylaws and upon what grounds a
physician can substantiate a challenge.
Of all the challenges brought by physicians against peer
review decisions, breach of bylaws has been recognized most
widely as a challenge that will overturn a peer review decision
because the courts and JCAHO have determined that medical
staff bylaws constitute a binding contract between the hospital
and the medical staff physicians. 147 For example, in Spencer v.
Community Hospital of Evanston,148 the court stated that
when a physician's privileges are revoked or reduced the hospi-
tal must follow its bylaws in the decision-making process. 149
And more recently, in Alfredson v. Lewisburg Community
Hospital,1 50 the court indicated that the medical staff bylaws
must be followed as "a hospital's bylaws are an integral part of
its contractual relationship with the members of its medical
staff." 15' Furthermore, some courts have ruled that, in addition
145. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
146. Blum, supra note 16, at 438.
147. See, e.g., Miller v. Indian Hosp., 419 A.2d 1191, 1193 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)
(hospital bylaws are binding contracts between a health care provider and the hospital);
Bhatnagar v. Mid-Maine Med. Ctr., 510 A.2d 233, 234 (Me. 1986) (stating that hospital
bylaws "constitute an enforceable contract between [the physician] and [the hospital]").
148. 408 N.E.2d 981 (I11. App. 1980).
149. Id. at 984 (quoting Jain v. Northwest Community Hosp., 385 N.E.2d 108, 112
(Ill. App. 1978)).
150. No. 88-311-II, 1989 WL 134739 (Tenn. App. Nov. 8, 1989), rev'd in part on
other grounds, Lewisburg Community Hosp. v. Alfredson, 805 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1991).
151. Id. at 7 (citing Pariser v. Christian Health Care Sys., Inc., 816 F.2d 1248, 1251
(8th Cir. 1987); Adler v. Montefiore Hosp. Ass'n, 311 A.2d 634, 645 (Pa. 1973), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 1131 (1974)).
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to creating a contractual obligation, hospital bylaws must be
followed as a matter of public policy.15 2
As discussed above, JCAHO specifically mandates that
hospitals have bylaws that incorporate the rules of self govern-
ance and that those bylaws are a binding contract that neither
party unilaterally may amend.1 53 Therefore, JCAHO is consis-
tent with the courts' decisions that hospital bylaws must be up-
held as legally binding contracts that cannot be altered unilat-
erally. Since these bylaws are considered a binding contract
between the physicians and the hospital and required to include
the rules for credentialing, a violation of the rules would lead to
a breach of contract claim. Therefore, in order to avoid a
breach of contract suit, these credentialing rules must be
followed.
Since its inception, peer review credentialing has been
used as a mechanism to keep out incompetent and poor quality
physicians.1 54 However, as hospitals are now considering the
use of economic criteria in the decision-making process, the by-
laws must be inspected to find approval for the use of such cri-
teria. Since current bylaws reflect the original intent of the
peer review process (that is quality and competence concerns),
finding such approval in the bylaws may prove difficult. It
would be especially difficult to find approval for basing a
credentialing decision solely upon economic criteria while ig-
noring all quality and competence concerns. In order to receive
such approval, medical staff bylaws would have to be amended
to include economic criteria. A special provision must be imple-
mented into the bylaws to uphold a decision based solely upon
economic considerations. Would a hospital attempt to unilater-
ally amend the bylaws? If it did, it would not only run up
against an array of legal precedent but also the JCAHO regu-
152. See Balkissoon v. Capitol Hill Hosp., 558 A.2d 304, 308 (App. D.C. 1989)
("The Hospital's obligation to follow its bylaws does not arise only from a contractual
relationship with [the physician] . . . [t]he public has a substantial interest .... "). In
Balkissoon, the court decided that the hospital was obligated to follow its bylaws due to
the public's interest in effectively operated hospitals. Id. The court believed that the public
had an interest in seeing that hospitals follow their bylaws and do not act arbitrarily:
"Thus, while sharing the interest of hospitals that only qualified doctors be given staff
privileges, the public also has an interest in assuring that staff decisions are not made
arbitrarily. A hospital's failure to comply with material procedures delineated in its bylaws
is inherently arbitrary." Id.
153. See supra notes 2, 80 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
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lations that specifically forbid such an act. Since medical staff
bylaws cannot be unilaterally amended, such an alteration
would require not only the approval of the governing board, but
the approval of the medical staff as well. However, attempting
to convince a medical staff to agree with such amendments will
be an arduous task. "Attempts by hospitals to impose a system
of economic credentialing will cause enormous stresses and
strains on an already tenuous relationship between medical
staffs and hospital boards."'15 5 Physicians will not approve of
amending hospital bylaws to provide for economic credentialing
because such factors are not in the best interest of their pa-
tients or themselves.'56 If the medical staff will not support
such amendments, economic credentialing will be prevented
from being introduced to hospital bylaws, effectively providing
physicians with a legal challenge to any such decision.
However, some courts may interpret a hospital's bylaws as
already allowing economic credentialing with such phrases as
"in pursuit of institutional objectives" or "any other relevant
factors." Even though these phrases allow the use of economic
factors in the decisionmaking process, they really amount to
the permissible use of utilization review.' Since economic
credentialing is distinct from utilization review, 58 such inclu-
sive language in hospital bylaws will not permit the exclusive
use of economic criteria in the peer-review process. Without a
specific provision in the medical staff bylaws allowing for the
use of economic credentialing, such a policy will constitute a
breach of the hospital's contractual obligation.
155. Lang, supra note 11, at 28.
156. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (focusing on physicians' disincen-
tive to hold back on health care).
157. See Greene, supra note II at 30. This is because these phrases commonly are
written to add to quality and competency factors already required in the credentialing deci-
sion. For example: "Physicians will be reviewed on quality and competency criteria and
any other relevant factors," the "and" implies "in addition to" - still not allowing eco-
nomic credentialing. If the bylaws read: "quality and competency criteria or economic cri-
teria," the "or" would imply the ability to use exclusively economic criteria.
158. See Greene, supra note 11 (discussing the differences between utilization review
and economic credentialing).
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C. The Antitrust Challenge
Federal antitrust laws are considered "fully applicable in
the context of the health care industry."'159 Therefore, with the
possibility of treble damages, federal antitrust challenges have
"posed the biggest threat" of all the challenges brought by
physicians in peer review litigation.6 0
Although sometimes with considerable skepticism,'' the
courts have continued to entertain antitrust challenges to peer
review decisions because "[a]buse of the peer-review process is
not just hypothetically possible but has been found to have oc-
curred in a small but significant number of cases. '"182
The goal of the federal antitrust laws is to preserve compe-
tition in the marketplace by forbidding certain anti-competitive
conduct. In particular, Section 1 of the Sherman Act6 3 renders
unlawful "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade."'6 4 Since by defi-
nition, peer review activity involves a form of concerted activ-
ity, peer review decisions have great potential for antitrust vio-
159. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 31, at 39 & n.222.
160. Scott, supra note 58, at 332.
161. See Scott, supra note 58, at 335 ("This sentiment is perhaps founded on a
lurking judicial suspicion that many, if not most, such cases are illegitimate . . .");
Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 31, at 37 ("As plaintiffs have sought to have antitrust
doctrine applied to hospital peer-review activity, it has become clear that courts have, in
general, been very wary of what they perceive to be a questionable, if not illicit,
relationship.").
162. Scott, supra note 58, at 336. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988),
reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1243 (1988) (holding that the medical staff violated §§ 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act by participating in peer reviews in order to reduce competition); Oltz v.
St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that a nurse was
harmed by conspiracy of anesthesia service providers that was designed to eliminate
competition).
163. Section 1 states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprison-
ment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court.
15 U.S.C.S. § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1994).
164. Id. Section 1 does not apply to independent action. "An economic entity 'gener-
ally has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does so
independently.'" Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 31, at 25 (quoting Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp, 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984)).
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lations.' 65 In order to prevail in a Section 1 action against peer
review activity, three elements must be proven. First, the physi-
cian must prove the peer review affects interstate commerce.
Second, the physician must prove the peer review decision was
made by a contract, combination or conspiracy. Finally, the
physician must prove the peer review decision produced an ad-
verse and anticompetitive effect on competition.
1. Affecting Interstate Commerce
To analyze a peer review decision under the Sherman Act,
it must first be determined whether or not the conduct (the
peer-review activity) is in or substantially affects interstate
commerce. 6  This had been seen as a jurisdictional "stumbling
block" to physicians who could not show that the peer review
decision had such an effect. 67 To get over this jurisdictional
hump, the physician had to identify, with evidence beyond the
pleadings, the relevant part of interstate commerce affected.' 6 8
However, in Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas,69 the Su-
preme Court made this jurisdictional requirement easier to
meet. In Pinhas, an ophthalmologist with privileges in a Los
Angeles hospital alleged a conspiracy between the hospital and
its staff to revoke his hospital privileges. 70 In alleging a viola-
tion of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Dr. Pinhas asserted that
excluding his services from the hospital had the required effect
on interstate commerce to give the court federal jurisdiction.
The Court held that since ophthalmological services are "regu-
larly performed for out-of-state patients and generate revenues
from out-of-state sources,"' 72 their exclusion would have "a
sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to support federal ju-
risdiction."'' 73 Since almost all hospital physicians treat out-of-
165. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 31, at 25. See also Scott, supra note 58, at 336
("The denial or termination of medical staff privileges necessarily has the effect of elimi-
nating a competitor and thus . . . raise[s] antitrust concerns.").
166. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980).
167. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 31, at 25 n.85 (citing McLain v. Real Estate
Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980)).
168. McLain, 444 U.S. at 242.
169. 111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991).
170. Id. at 1844.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1847.
173. Id. at 1849. The Court stated that although only one physician was excluded,
there was still federal jurisdiction:
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state patients and receive out-of-state revenue, the Pinhas deci-
sion effectively allows physicians excluded from health care en-
tities as a result of the peer-review process to almost always
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of affecting interstate
commerce.
174
2. Contract, Combination or Conspiracy
Since Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not wholly forbid
unilateral conduct, the physician must prove that two or more
distinct entities agreed to take action against him.'7 5 However,
officers or employees of corporations or divisions of corpora-
tions do not provide this required plurality. 176 Therefore, in or-
der for a physician to successfully sustain a Section 1 challenge
against an adverse peer-review decision, it must be determined
that the medical staff has the capacity to perform such a con-
certed activity.
The prevailing rule is established in Weiss v. York Hospi-
tal. 77 In Weiss, the court described the medical staff as:
[a] group of doctors, all of whom practice medicine in their
individual capacities, and each of whom is an independent
economic entity in competition with other doctors in the...
medical community. Each staff member, therefore, has an ec-
onomic interest separate from and in many cases in competi-
tion with the interests of other medical staff members. Under
[B]ecause the essence of any violation of § I is the illegal agreement itself -
rather than the overt acts performed in furtherance of it - proper analysis fo-
cuses, not upon actual consequences, but rather upon the potential harm that
would ensue if the conspiracy were successful . . . . Thus, respondent need not
allege, or prove, an actual effect on interstate commerce to support federal
jurisdiction.
Id. at 1847-48.
174. See Gale T. Miller, Antitrust Developments in 1990-91: U.S. Supreme Court
Decisions, 21 COLO. LAW. 235 (1992) ("The U.S. Supreme Court's decision [in Pinhas]
... makes it difficult to envision many health care cases that could not be reached by the
federal antitrust laws."); Diane Ruder, Antitrust and the Credentialing and Decredential-
ing of Physicians, 19 N. Ky. L. REv. 351, 353 (1992) (after Pinhas, "the common disputes
over denial of hospital staff privileges have become issues with a federal forum"); Einer
Elhauge, Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1177, 1196
n.105 (1992) (stating that "because the interstate commerce requirement is so weak, as a
practical matter it excludes very few restraints").
175. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)
(holding that, in order to find a § I violation, there must be concerted activity).
176. Id. at 770-71.
177. 745 F.2d 786, 816 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that "a single entity made up of
independent competing economic entities satisfies the joint action requirement of Sherman
Act Section 1").
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these circumstances, the medical staff cannot be considered a
single economic entity for the purposes of antitrust
analysis. 11
Therefore, the Weiss court concluded that the medical
staff's actions (which would include peer review decisions)
should be viewed as "actions of a combination of the individual
doctors who make it up. ' 179 As Weiss and other courts have
noted, 180 the medical staff of a hospital has the capacity to con-
spire amongst itself, therefore, creating a concerted activity
susceptible to antitrust scrutiny. Furthermore, by definition, a
peer review is a collective decision of the medical staff mem-
bers on the peer review committee. Therefore, every peer re-
view decision of the hospital medical staff has the potential for
an antitrust violation.
3. Producing Adverse and Anti-Competitive Effects
Once the physician has proven a conspiracy among the
medical staff, it must be further proven that the concerted ac-
tion caused an unreasonable restraint of trade. 8' Although all
commercial agreements may be said to somewhat restrain
trade, only unreasonable restraints violate Section 1. 12 Judging
the reasonableness of the restraint depends upon "its impact on
competition as a whole within the relevant market."' 3 The
courts have used two approaches in assessing the reasonable-
ness of such restraints: illegal per s and the rule of reason.
Illegal Per S: A court will hold conduct illegal per s6 when
the concerted activity has a "pernicious effect on competition
and lack[s] . . . any redeeming virtue."' 84 Such agreements
178. Id. at 815.
179. Id. at 816.
180. See, e.g., Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 706 (4th Cir. 1991)
("[Wlhen these actors [the physicians of the medical staff] join together to take action
among themselves, they are unlike a single entity and therefore they have the capacity to
conspire as a matter of law.").
181. Id. at 708.
182. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing, Co.,
472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985) (stating that, although the "decision of the cooperative members
to expel Pacific was certainly a restraint of trade in the sense that every commercial agree-
ment restrains trade. . . , whether this action violates § I of the Sherman Act depends on
whether it is adjudged an unreasonable restraint.").
183. Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 708.
184. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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are said to be so manifestly anticompetitive in nature that they
can be deemed illegal without close evaluation.185 However, the
lines between the per s6 rule and the rule of reason have been
blurred as courts have overruled previous per s6 cases and re-
fused to expand the categories of cases subject to the per s6
analysis. 18 Furthermore, courts have "been slow to condemn
rules adopted by professional associations as unreasonable per
"6 1187
Rule of Reason: Under the rule of reason analysis, the test of
legality is "whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.", 8 This
entails an analysis of "the facts peculiar to the business, the
history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was im-
posed."189 Furthermore, the restraint must be proven to have
the potential to produce "adverse, anticompetitive effects
within relevant product and geographical markets."' 90
Which Approach to Use? Under the per s6 rule, "anticompeti-
tive purpose[s] and anticompetitive effect are conclusively pre-
sumed to exist once the forbidden conduct is proven, so that
proof of the forbidden conduct is by itself proof of an antitrust
185. Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1445 & n.1. (9th Cir.
1988) (examples of such agreements are boycotts, concerted refusals to deal and price
fixing).
186. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 31, at 54. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) ("Although this Court has in the past stated that group
boycotts are unlawful per s6. . .the category of restraints classed as group boycotts is not
to be expanded indiscriminately, and the per s6 approach has generally been limited
....."); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9-14 (1984) (holding
that, although tying arrangements were traditionally deemed per s6 illegal, they are only
per s6 illegal if the seller has the ability "to force a purchaser to do something that he
would not do in a competitive market").
187. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 458.
188. Id. (quoting Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
189. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978).
190. Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1195 (6th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984). Commodities that are reasonably interchangea-
ble by consumers for the same purposes are considered within the relevant product. United
States v. Du Pont, 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956). The area in which a potential buyer ration-
ally may look for the goods and services he seeks is considered within the relevant geo-
graphical area. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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violation." 19' Such an approach would be inappropriate in eval-
uating peer review decisions. The conduct being analyzed in
credentialing cases is the peer review decision of the medical
staff. Under the per s6 rule, every challenged peer review deci-
sion would have to be held invalid because that conduct would
be considered "unlawful in and of itself, without regard to the
effect of the conduct or the purpose of those engaging in it."'19 2
Since the peer review process is not so "inherently anticompeti-
tive" this approach would not be appropriate for determining
anticompetitiveness.19 3
Since the per s6 rule is inappropriate in evaluating the an-
ticompetitiveness of peer reviews, a rule of reason approach
should be used. The rule of reason approach is better suited to
this evaluation because under this rule, "the anticompetitive
purpose or effect of the conduct" must be proven. 94 Since a
peer review very often has no anticompetitive purpose, this case
by case approach will eliminate more accurately only the an-
ticompetitive peer reviews. 95 Therefore, in order for a physi-
cian to prove that an adverse peer review decision violated Sec-
tion 1, he must prove that the decision unreasonably restrained
trade by having an anticompetitive effect within the relevant
market. 96
191. Peter M. Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Tri-
umph of the Chicago School, in THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 319, 322 (Philip B. Kur-
land et al. eds., 1982).
192. Id.
193. Peer reviews hardly can be seen as inherently anticompetitive in and of them-
selves as they are mandated by JCAHO, hospital bylaws, state statutes and protected by
the HCQIA to further quality and competence concerns. See supra notes 47-80 and ac-
companying text.
194. Gerhart, supra note 191, at 322 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1 (1911)).
195. Courts have applied such an analysis to challenges of peer review decisions. See
Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 708-09 (4th Cir. 1991) (where the court
used the rule of reason approach to evaluate a physician's § I claim against the medical
staff for revoking his privileges).
196. If the peer review decision has legitimate procompetitive value, it will not be
considered an antitrust violation. See Health Care Lawyers Probe Antitrust Law Develop-
ments, 58 ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION REPORT, Feb. 22, 1990, at 268 (including
the following procompetitive reasons: inadequate skill, experience, failure to carry malprac-
tice insurance, disruptive personality and unwillingness to take staff member responsibili-
ties). Furthermore, the peer review may be immune from antitrust litigation. See infra
notes 205-14 and accompanying text.
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As mentioned above, Section 1 violations have been proven
in several cases. 9 ' The Supreme Court in Patrick v. Burget'98
affirmed the circuit court's decision that Oregon physicians vio-
lated the Sherman Act when they improperly participated in
peer review activity, resulting in the loss of Dr. Patrick's hospi-
tal privileges. 199 The events of this case occurred in Astoria,
Oregon, a town with a population of 10,000200 and with one
hospital and one private clinic.2 0' Patrick, who had privileges in
the hospital as a general and vascular surgeon, declined an of-
fer to become a partner in the private clinic and instead set up
a private practice to compete with the clinic. 2  Physicians of
the clinic initiated and participated in a peer review evaluation
of Patrick, which resulted in the loss of his privileges at the
community's one hospital.203
Patrick illustrates a classic example of a medical staff un-
reasonably restraining trade by having an anticompetitive ef-
fect within the relevant market. Since there was only one hospi-
tal in the area, the relevant market was established.0 4
Furthermore, since the restraint on trade was contrary to the
legitimate purpose of the peer review process and had no
procompetitive effects, such evidence was sufficient to deter-
mine concerted activity in violation of Section 1.
4. Immunity To Antitrust Liability
The Patrick decision also illustrates that the state-action
doctrine20 5 of antitrust immunity will not protect peer review
197. See supra note 162.
198. 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
199. Id. at 96-98.
200. Id. at 95.
201. Id. at 96.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 97.
204. A similar finding occurred in Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d
1440 (9th Cir. 1988). In 01lz, a nurse anesthetist was terminated following an exclusive
staff agreement between the hospital and the anesthesiologists. Id. at 1443. Oltz sued the
hospital and anesthesiologists for antitrust violations. Id. at 1444. On appeal, the hospital
argued that there was no injury to competition because the lower court improperly defined
the relevant market. Id. at 1445. However, the Ninth Circuit determined that it was "ines-
capable" to find that the one-hospital town was the relevant market for finding antitrust
injury. Id. at 1446-47.
205. The state-action doctrine, also known as the Parker defense, arose out of the
Supreme Court case Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The Court held that the Sher-
man Act did not intend "to restrain state action or official action directed by a state." Id.
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activity.2"6 The Court recognized that "effective peer review is
essential to the provision of quality medical care" and the pos-
sible "chilling effect" that could fall upon peer review if immu-
nity is not granted.20 7 However, the Court concluded that un-
less Congress grants such immunity by law, the only state-
action immunity that would be granted is where "the State ef-
fectively has made this conduct its own." 208
Following Patrick, Congress provided limited antitrust im-
munity for participants in medical staff peer reviews in the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 ("HCQIA"). °9
The HCQIA is Congress's way of "accurately and expedi-
tiously distinguishing . . legitimate peer review activity"
(that which is intended to improve the quality of care) from
abusive peer review activity.210 Therefore, in order to qualify
for protection, the peer reviewers must base their decision on
"the competence or professional conduct of an individual physi-
cian (which conduct affects or could affect adversely the health
or welfare of a patient or patients)."21'
In furthering its efforts to protect only good-faith peer re-
views, the drafters of the HCQIA specifically stated instances
that would not be considered based on competence or profes-
sional conduct. This list includes decisions based on whether or
not a physician joined a professional society, the fees or adver-
tising of the physician, the economic organization of the medi-
cal practice, or the physician's activities with other health care
professionals.212 Since this list is not intended to be complete,
at 351. This rationale subsequently was applied to private parties whose challenged re-
straint was "clearly articulated as state policy" and must be "actively supervised by the
State itself." Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988).
206. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 105-06.
209. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11111-11115 (1988). The immunity is only from damages in an
antitrust suit. Id. at § 1111 (a)(1) The immunity does not apply to a suit for injunctive
relief. See Scott, supra note 58, at 323 n.24, 332 n.69.
210. Scott, supra note 58, at 321. See also id. at 330 (stating that "[e]xamples of
abuse of the peer review process include adverse peer review decisions made, not because of
any incompetence or misconduct on the physicians' part, but because of their race or origin
or the race or origin of their patients; because the physicians served poor, uninsured, or
underinsured patients; because they posed an economic threat to other physicians; because
of some other 'turf battle' among medical specialists; or because they blew the whistle on
other colleagues who were incompetent.").
211. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (1988).
212. Id. at §11151(9)(A)-(D).
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the Act states that immunity is excluded for "any other matter
that does not relate to the competence or professional conduct
of a physician. '"213 Therefore, the above provisions conclusively
support Congress' intent that medical staff peer review is to be
used legitimately to "improve the quality of medical care in
this country by encouraging the medical profession to rid itself
of bad doctors. 2 14
5. Another Obstacle For Economic Credentialing
If an adverse peer review decision were based solely upon
economic criteria, a stronger antitrust case may be brought by
a disgruntled physician. 15 First, economic credentialing would
not fall under the protection of the HCQIA immunity provi-
sions, because basing a credentialing decision solely upon eco-
nomic considerations does not relate to the competence or pro-
fessional conduct of a physician. As noted above, if a physician
was affected adversely by a peer review decision because he
served poor patients, because he was an economic threat to
other physicians or because of some sort of "turf battle," the
reviewers would not receive immunity. 16
Furthermore, from the discussions noted in the Congres-
sional and House Reports, it is evident that this immunity is to
be construed narrowly. The main purpose of this immunity is to
"improve the quality of medical care in this country by encour-
aging the medical profession to rid itself of bad doctors. 21 1
Therefore, unless the economic criteria was somehow evidence
of quality concerns, the protection would not be provided. 8
Certainly, in a case of economic credentialing, where econom-
ics were the sole criteria, such immunity would be
inappropriate.
213. Id. at § 11151(9)(E).
214. Scott, supra note 58, at 318. See also H.R. REP. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986) (a favorable report by Mr. Dingel submitted to the Committee on Energy and
Commerce concerning H.R. 5540, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) which sought to encourage
physician peer review).
215. This is assuming the physician could prove that a conspiracy existed. Economic
criteria will not make this part of the analysis any stronger, it only strengthens the unrea-
sonableness of the restraint.
216. Scott, supra note 58, at 330 & n.55-60.
217. Id. at 318.
218. If the economic criteria were evidence of some quality concern, this would be a
legitimate use of the peer review process. See supra note 84 (discussing utilization review).
1994]
HEALTH MATRIX
Since antitrust immunity would not be available for eco-
nomic credentialing, participants in such peer review decisions
would be subject to the federal antitrust laws. As discussed
above, challenges to peer reviews are said to have met the juris-
dictional requirement.219 Furthermore, the hospital medical
staff is considered to have the capacity to conspire.22 ° Addition-
ally, situations arise where the restraint on trade, via the peer
review decision, is within the relevant market.221 Therefore, if
the restraint is unreasonable and not pro-competitive, the peer
review decision will violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Economic credentialing can be an unreasonable and anti-
competitive restraint of trade.222 Under a rule of reason analy-
sis, the court must consider the reasons why the adverse peer
review decision was imposed.223 If the reasons are legitimate,
that would evidence a reasonable restraint of trade. However,
in light of the lengthy discussions revolving around the HCQIA
immunity provisions, a peer review based solely on economic
considerations may be an inappropriate abuse of the peer re-
view system. In a case such as Patrick, where there is only one
hospital, such a restraint significantly would reduce competition
and might affect drastically the quality and availability of care
to the public. The fact that a peer review decision was based
solely on economic considerations would be additional evidence
that the restraint was unreasonable and anti-competitive.
Therefore, economic credentialing may enhance an already
plausible antitrust challenge of an adverse peer review
decision.224
219. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
222. Courts have held that peer review itself can be viewed as pro-competitive. See,
e.g., Marin v. Citizens Memorial Hosp., 700 F. Supp. 354, 361 (S.D Tex. 1988) ("restrict-
ing staff privileges to doctors who maintain a basic level of medical competency is ulti-
mately pro-competitive not anti-competitive"); Quinn v. Kent Gen. Hosp,, 617 F. Supp.
1226, 1239 (D.C. Del. 1985) ("[Pleer review process is arguably pro-competitive, for by
monitoring the qualifications and performance of physicians it may compensate for the
relative lack of information about these matters by consumers."). These cases illustrate
that where peer review is used to promote quality of care concerns, it will be considered
pro-competitive. Therefore, by excluding quality concerns and focusing solely on economic
criteria, the pro-competitive value noted by these courts arguably is lost.
223. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978).
224. Economic credentialing is not necessarily anticompetitive in every instance. If
that were the case, it would be possible to consider economic credentialing as being inher-
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IV. CONCLUSION
The main goal of the peer review process is to provide pa-
tients with top quality care by competent physicians. As intro-
duced by the common law of hospital corporate liability and
further supported by JCAHO, as inscribed in hospital bylaws
and as protected by the HCQIA, the peer review system effec-
tively functions to rid the medical field of incompetent physi-
cians. As stated in such laws and policies, peer review decisions
are to be evaluated based on competence and quality concerns.
Economic credentialing substitutes economic criteria for
the required quality concerns. The result is that a physician
may be denied privileges or have existing privileges revoked
based solely upon economic criteria regardless of the physi-
cian's competency and regardless of the impact on society.
Such peer review decisions do not serve the public's interest
and run afoul of statutory law, common law and hospital by-
laws. Notwithstanding the hospital's concern for its bottom
line, society cannot tolerate the effects of economic credential-
ing. Hospitals always must remember that they exist to serve
the public's interest, not their own private interests.
Brad Dallett
ently anticompetitive and a per s6 violation. However, since it may be possible that eco-
nomic credentialing may occur while not being anticompetitive, the sole use of economic
criteria in the peer review process should provide additional support to an existing claim of
an antitrust violation.
t J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1994).
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